DEFAMATION CASE LAW UPDATE
Mauck v. Athens Pride, Inc., 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 533, *1
Key Legal Holdings
- Communications about a public figure’s statements on LGBTQ+ issues made at a public hearing constitute protected activity under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute when made in the context of an ongoing public controversy.
- When a business relationship was terminated before the defendant’s alleged interference (here, two days before Bell’s email), the plaintiff cannot establish causation for tortious interference.
- When a defendant’s characterization of a plaintiff’s statements (that she called LGBTQ+ individuals pedophiles) is substantially similar to what the plaintiff actually said (that LGBTQ+ is inclusive of pedophiles), the statement is not actionably false for purposes of a libel claim.
Material Facts
- Mauck made public comments at a library board hearing suggesting the LGBTQ+ acronym is inclusive of pedophiles.
- Bonanno sent an email to Mauck’s broker expressing concerns about Mauck’s comments.
- Allen terminated his broker relationship with Mauck on July 11, 2023.
- Bell sent an email to Allen about Mauck’s comments and filed an ethics complaint on July 13, 2023, two days after Allen had already terminated his relationship with Mauck.
- Mauck sued defendants for defamation, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices.
Controlling Law
- Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute (OCGA § 9-11-11.1), which protects acts in furtherance of free speech rights on issues of public interest; OCGA § 10-1-372 (Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Georgia law on tortious interference with business relationships; Georgia defamation law.
Court Rationale
The court determined Mauck’s claims arose from protected activity because: (1) Mauck was a public figure due to her political involvement; (2) the defendants’ communications were made in the context of an ongoing public controversy; and (3) the statements concerned matters of public interest. The court found Mauck could not establish probability of success on her claims because the defendants’ statements were substantially true, the business relationship was terminated before Bell’s communication, and the statements did not create likelihood of confusion under the UDTPA.
Procedural Outcome
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute.
Matthews v. Oskouei, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 485, *1
Key Legal Holdings
- The Court of Appeals erred by applying improperly engrafting the constitutional “actual malice” standard into OCGA § 51-5-9.
- The trial court needed to determine whether Dr. Oskouei is a public or private figure and whether he seeks presumed or punitive damages related to a defamatory statement about a matter of public concern, as neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court made this initial determination.
Material Facts
- Matthews made allegedly defamatory statements to two opposing counsel during ongoing litigation.
- Matthews moved to strike Oskouei’s complaint under Georgia’s Anti-SLAPP statute.
- The trial court denied Matthews’ motion.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Matthews’ statements were conditionally privileged and Oskouei failed to show actual malice.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether ‘actual malice’ was the proper standard under OCGA § 51-5-9.
Controlling Law
- OCGA § 9-11-11.1(b)(1) – Georgia’s Anti-SLAPP statute.
- OCGA § 51-5-7(7) – Conditional privilege for comments of counsel fairly made.
- OCGA § 51-5-9 – Right of action when privilege is used as a cloak for venting private malice.
- First Amendment limitations on state defamation law as established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
Court Rationale
The Supreme Court thus held that the appellate court improperly engrafted the constitutional “actual malice” standard into OCGA § 51-5-9. The appellate court vacated Division (b) of its prior opinion to the extent that it held that Oskouei could only defeat the conditional privilege under the actual malice standard. The supreme court did not disturb the appellate court’s conclusion that Matthews had made a prima facie showing that his allegedly defamatory statements were conditionally privileged under OCGA § 51-5-7(7). There was no determination of whether the plaintiff was a public or private figure, necessitating a remand.
Procedural Outcome
The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment in part and remanded to the trial court to determine whether Oskouei is a public or private figure and whether he seeks presumed or punitive damages related to a defamatory statement about a matter of public concern, to establish which malice standard applies.